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THE TENSIONS OF A DUAL COURT SYSTEM
AND SOME PRESCRIPTIONS FOR RELIEF*

For nearly two hundred years, our federal constitutional
structure has been subject to some significant strains arising
out of the need to maintain a proper balance of power between
state and national governments.

Nowhere has the stress been more

evident than in the problems generated by the side-by-side
existence of federal and state courts.

The United States Supreme

Court recently referred to "the tensions inherent in a system
that contemplates parallel judicial processes."!

It is my

purpose to discuss some of those tensions, to review the measures
that have been established to alleviate them, and to suggest some
other palliative approaches grounded in the principles of comity
and federalism of which the Supreme Court so often speaks..

My

discussion will focus on frictions produced by the exercise of
federal court jurisdiction in cases involving diversity of
citizenship, habeas corpus, civil rights, criminal law and
attorney discipline.
The potential for friction between state and federal court
systems was foreseen early on.

James Madison's Journal of the

Constitutional Convention records the following comments made
during the debate over the provision for inferior federal courts:

Mr. Butler could see no necessity for such
tribunals.
The State Tribunals might do the
business ..
Mr. L. Martin concurred. They will create
jealousies and opposition in the State Tribunals,
with the jurisdiction of which they will interfere.2
Ultimately, of course, the Constitution provided for "such
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."3

Alexander Hamilton attempted to downplay the

potential for conflict in the dual court system spawned by this
provision.

In No. 81 of the Federalist Papers, he wrote that

"the authority of the judicial department

.. has been

carefully restricted to those cases which are manifestly proper
for the cognizance of the national judicature."4
however, that there was a question as to
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Acknowledging,

What relation would

subsist between the national and state courts in
. instances of concurrent jurisdiction,"5 he indicated that
the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
in respect of both court systems, would resolve such problems as
might arise.6

The only purpose of having inferior courts,

according to Hamilton, was "to obviate the necessity of having
recourse to the supreme court, in every case of federal
cognizance."7
What Hamilton never contemplated was inferior federal court
interference with state court decisions and decision-making
through the exercise of an expanded federal question jurisdiction
granted by Congress and approved by the Supreme Court.

Hamilton

was not even very prescient in his explanation of how conflicts

?

inherent in the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction would be
resolved.

The explanation he provided failed to answer the

following question, posed in one of the anti-federalist essays:
If the State courts ha~e concurrent
jurisdiction with the inferior federal
courts, . . • is it not self-evident that
there may be different adjudications on the
SAME question • • . if decided in the
inferior federal court with an appeal, [or]
if decided in a State court without any
appeal, to the supreme federal court?8
There was extended debate in Congress prior to the adoption
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created an inferior federal
court system consisting of district and circuit courts as
authorized by the newly-ratified Constitution.9

Those who

foresaw conflict with the state courts opposed adoption of the
Act.

One congressman, with obvious sarcasm, "asked whether the

people could ever consider such an accumulation of courts of
justice calculated to promote their interest."lO

He answered his

rhetorical question by saying "he was sure, under the
circumstances, the freemen of America could never submit to
it.nll

Another congressman predicted disaster in these words:

"[S]eparate jurisdiction will twine into such a state of
perplexity, as to render it impossible for human wisdom to
disentangle it without injurye"l2

He pointed to the historical

example of the English courts that "put the whole community in
commotion with the clashing of their jurisdictions."l3
The concurrent authority of state and federal courts to
resolve controversies between citizens of different states often
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produces the type of clashing referred to in the Judiciary Act
debates.

The original reasons for the establishment of diversity

of citizenship jurisdiction in the inferior federal courts are
unclear.

In the Virginia Ratifying Convention, John Marshall

opined that, although such jurisdiction was not absolutely
essential in general, it might prove to be needed in connection
with "the laws and regulations of commerce" and "in cases of
debt, and some other controversies."l4

A similar concern with

commerce was expressed at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
by James Wilson, who there spoke of the need to provide a "just
and impartial tribunal" as a means of restoring publ.ic and
private credit and of providing "security . .
discharge of contracts."lS

. for the regular

Hamilton's argument in the matter

was based on the need to maintain an "equality of privileges and
immunities" in cases where citizens of one state are opposed to
Although it has been disputed,

the citizens of another state.l6

the most commonly accepted reason for conferring diversity
jurisdiction on the federal courts has been the fear of prejudice
to out-of-state litigants.l7

In any event, diversity

jurisdiction has been with us in one form or another since the
original Judiciary Act was adopted pursuant to Article III of the
Constitution.

At least until general federal question

jurisdiction was conferred in 1875,18 it apparently accounted for
a substantial portion of the business of the federal courts.
wbatever the reason for its establishment, diversity
jurisdiction presently is a source of substantial tension between
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state and federal courts at both the trial and appellate levels.
It is not at all unusual for a plaintiff to commence an action
based on diversity jurisdiction in the federal district court
that is in all respects similar to an action already commenced in
the state court, or vice versa.

Attorneys find it most difficult

to explain to their clients the reason for the double expense
necessarily incurred in defending the same action in two courts.
The potential for conflict increases as each case progresses,
because there are two judges monitoring discovery, hearing
motions and scheduling the procedural steps leading to trial.
When a case finally reaches a conclusion by the entry of judgment
in one court, the doctrine of res judicata concludes the case in
the other court,l9 rendering useless all the time, money and
effort expended in the second court.
~

Another area of conflict in

diversity cases is the invocation of the removal statute,20 which
provides for the transfer of such cases from state to federal
courts at the mere demand of a defendant.

It is, of course, the

Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution21 that allows
Congress to enact a statute permitting the ouster of state court
jurisdiction by this means.
The greatest tension between state and federal court systems
in diversity cases, however, occurs when there are different
adjudications of the same issue by courts of concurrent
jurisdiction, a problem referred to in the anti-federalist essay
quoted earlier.22

Although conflicting rules of decision are not

uncommon where there is concurrent jurisdiction, this particular

tension supposedly was relieved in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,23 when
the Supreme Court determined that federal courts must apply state
substantive law in diversity cases.

Nevertheless, the

application of state law by the federal courts can present
serious difficulties when a state's highest court has not yet
resolved a specific issue or when state decisional law seems to
be moving in a new direction.

The rule in such cases seems to be

that the federal court must predict what the highest state court
would do when confronted with the question.24

In the Second

Circuit Court of Appeals, we "make our best estimate" of what the
state's highest court would do, giving consideration to "all the
resources" that court could use, including the decisions of other
jurisdictions.25

Should the prediction be wrong, the inevitable

consequence is not only tension between the court systems but
also a losing federal litigant who could have prevailed by
pressing the issue to conclusion in the state court system.
The devices heretofore used to relieve diversity tensions
caused by conflicting decisions, or the desire to avoid them,
have proved less than satisfactory.

The device of judgment

modification, for example, is highly impractical.

Federal court

diversity judgments cannot be modified every time a state supreme
court changes direction and undermines the basis for the federal
judgments.

Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has gone

as far as to recall its mandate in order to modify a judgment
after a state supreme court reversal of an intermediate appellate
court decision upon which the Circuit had relied,26 the process
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employed is an especially cumbersome one.

It also rests almost

entirely in the court's discretion and is less likely to be used
as time passes following the entry of judgment.27

There is also

a question as to what sources of state law can form the basis for
modification.

One district court suggested that an unreported

decision of the Tennessee Chancery Court might impel the Second
Circuit to grant a rehearing in a diversity case to correct its
earlier estimate of Tennessee law!28

Strangely enough, the

Second Circuit estimate was based on a Sixth Circuit evaluation
of the descendibility of the right of publicity in the state of
Tennessee.29

It was made in the context of a dispute over the

right to exploit the name and likeness of Elvis Presley,
apparently a valuable property right.30
Federal courts also have invoked the doctrine of abstention
as a means of avoiding interference with the administration of
state law by state courts and of maintaining consistency in the
decisional law.

However, the very limited circumstances in which

abstention can be applied in diversity cases has restricted its
value as a tension reliever.

While the Supreme Court has allowed

federal courts to abstain from the exercise of their diversity
jurisdiction when state law was unclear,31 it also has spoken of
"the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to
exercise the jurisdiction given them."32

Although the Court has

approved deference to state tribunals when difficult and
important questions of state law transcend the results in a
particular case,33 it also has held "that difficulties and
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perplexities of state law are no reason for referral of the
problem to the state court."34

In the face of these conflicting

signals from the Supreme Court, commentators have been vociferous
in their condemnation of any yielding of federal court
jurisdiction through the judicially created doctrine of
abstention.35

Deference to parallel state court proceedings for

reasons of wise judicial administration and economy of judicial'
resources especially have been criticized for failure to
recognize the jurisdictional responsibilities of federal courts
as mandated by Congress.36

In its most recent pronouncement on

this type of abstention, the Supreme Court has indicated that
deference to state court litigation involves the balancing of a
number of factors, "with the balance heavily weighted in favor of
the exercise of jurisdiction."37
A preferred means of avoiding the clash of different rules
of decision in diversity cases is the certification of questions
of law by federal courts to state courts.

The problem with this

procedure is that, for the most part, acceptance of the inquiry
is discretionary with the highest court of the state, and
certification may come only from a Circuit Court or the United
States Supreme Court.

The jurisdiction recently conferred on the

New York Court of Appeals to review certified state law questions
is limited in this fashion.38

Although the New York Court of

Appeals already has accepted two certifications from the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals,39 it has rejected such a question on
one occasion.40

The rejection understandably was grounded in the

Q

policy of New York's highest court to address important questions
of state law only after they were filtered through the lower and
intermediate appellate courts.41
More out of concern for the burgeoning caseload of
the federal courts than for the tensions of a dual court system,
numerous proposals to modify diversity jurisdiction have been
made over the years.

In 1965 the American Law Institute proposed

that plaintiffs be barred from bringing diversity actions in
their home states; that business enterprises be prohibited from
invoking diversity jurisdiction, either originally or by removal,
in any state where they maintain a local establishment; and that
natural persons be denied access to the federal courts in the
state where they have their principal place of business or
employment.42

There have been proposals that appeals to the

United States Courts in diversity cases be made discretionary;43
that diversity jurisdiction be abolished except in multi-party
tort cases;44 that federal courts be authorized to abstain in
diversity cases if adequate and timely state remedies exist;45
and that a system for the mandatory arbitration of diversity
claims be established.46
It seems to me, however, that total elimination of diversity
jurisdiction is the best prescription for the relief of the
tensions it causes.

Although I have in the past suggested an

increase in the amount in controversy as a compromise with those
who are opposed to the complete elimination of diversity
jurisdiction,47 I now am convinced that the time has come for

a

complete repeal.

Diversity causes more trouble than it is worth.

It fails a cost/benefit analysis and just about any other test
that can be applied to it.

Most of all, it creates unnecessary

stress in our dual court system by making possible conflicting
adjudications and procedural interferences.

While the courts

have been creative in fashioning the doctrine of abstention and
in creating the domestic relations and probate exceptions to
diversity jurisdiction,48 the limited reach of these devices
makes it clear that congressional action is necessary.
Whenever a single federal judge grants a writ of habeas
corpus releasing a state prisoner whose conviction was affirmed
by the state's highest court, there is a palpable strain in the
dual court system.

In such a case, the message from the inferior

federal court to the state judges involved in the proceeding is
as follows:

"Although you have sworn to uphold the Constitution

of the United States, you have failed to correct a violation of
the federal constitutional rights of this defendant; you have
failed in your trial court, in your intermediate appellate court,
and in the highest tribunal of your system; and the fact that the.
United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari review is of no
importance ...

This message, of course, has been made possible by

the congressional grant of power to federal judges to "entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States."49
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As a consequence of

this provision, a significant portion of the workload of the
federal judiciary is composed of habeas corpus challenges to
state convictions.SO

Representatives of the state court systems

have not been hesitant in calling for repeal of federal court
jurisdiction over these challenges.Sl
Congress has provided for some alleviation of the tensions
it created in the Habeas Corpus Act through certain provisions in
the Act itself.

The statute requires that state court remedies

be exhausted52 and that state court fact-finding be presumed
correct if certain criteria, such as a full, fair and adequate
hearing, are met.S3

The statute also provides that no appeal

from denial of the writ may be taken without a certificate of
probable cause.54

Procedural rules have been adopted allowing

for summary dismissal of facially insufficient habeas petitionsSS
and for denial of the writ when delayed or successive petitions
have been filed.S6

The Supreme Court has added some tension

relieving elements through decisional law -- the rule that a
state's contemporaneous objection requirement must be respected
in the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice;57 the rule
that a Fourth Amendment claim will not form the basis for habeas
relief if there was an opportunity for full and fair litigation
of the claim in the state court;58 and the rule prohibiting the
joinder of exhausted and unexhausted claims.59
Despite these measures, the clash of jurisdictions continues.
At its last term, the Supreme Court was faced with the question
of what law to apply when a successful habeas petitioner seeks
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release pending the state's appea1.60

Referring to "traditional

notions of federalism and comity, .. Justice Marshall, in dissent,
wrote that state rules, as applied by state courts, should govern
release Cor "enlargement" as it is called in the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure).61

For the majority, Chief Justice

Rehnquist enumerated various considerations that should prevail
and rejected state law as the rule of decision.62

As to the

federalism and comity concerns of the dissenters, he asserted
that any strains in federal-state relations stemming from the
exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction "comes because of the
granting of habeas relief itself, and not the existence of any
discretion to refuse enlargement pending appeal.n63
The sheer volume of frivolous habeas filings64 and the
obvious confusion engendered by redundant adjudications,65 as
well as the strains alluded to by the Chief Justice, have led to
proposals to restrict further the scope of federal habeas
jurisdiction.

A bill recently introduced in Congress proposes a

one-year statute of limitations for filing habeas petitions
(there presently is no limitation period), and a requirement
that, prior to the consideration of any constitutional claim,
there be a showing that the state court has not "fully and fairly
adjudicated" the claim.66

In the past, the Justice Department

has supported legislation limiting habeas to constitutional
issues relating to fact-finding in the state courts;67 it also
has supported legislation'requiring a showing of a basis for
reasonable doubt as to guilt.68

Some Supreme Court Justices now
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seem inclined to require a colorable demonstration of factual
innocence in habeas petitions,69 and Professor Remington has made
out a persuasive argument in support of his conclusion that
n[f]ocusing on the possibility of innocence seems clearly best
from the point of view of the state prisoner and the state
correctional program."70
Although I previously have prescribed a five-year
limitations period, measured from the exhaustion of state
remedies, for the relief of the tension caused by federal habeas
jurisdiction,71 I now am convinced that stronger medicine is
necessary.

If there is to be true equality and mutual respect in

a parallel system of courts, there is no room for double
adjudications of the same issues in a single case.

Since the

United States Supreme Court stands at the apex of each system for
the adjudication of federal constitutional issues, it seems
especially ludicrous to allow the lowest court in the federal
system to tell the highest court in the state system that it is
wrong on the law.

Accordingly, I suggest that the proposal

advanced by Justice Jackson, Albany Law School's most
distinguished student, is most worthy of examination.
The Jackson proposal is set forth in his concurring opinion
in Brown v. Allen as follows:

My conclusion is that whether or not this
Court has denied certiorari from a state
court's judgment in a habeas corpus
proceeding, no lower federal court should
entertain a petition except on the following
conditions:
(1) that the petition raises a
jurisdictional question involving federal law
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on which the state law allowed no access to
its courts, either by habeas corpus or appeal
from the conviction, and that he therefore
has no state remedy; or (2) that the petition
shows that although the law allows a remedy,
he was actually improperly obstructed from
making a record upon which the question could
be presented, so that his remedy by way of
ultimate application to this Court for
certiorari has been frustrated.
There may be
circumstances so extraordinary that I do not
now think of them which would justify a
departure from this rule, but the run-of-themill case certainly does not.72
Although this formula may seem too restrictive to many, it seems
to me that it is an excellent prescription for the relief of
habeas corpus tension.

Moreover, the prescription is not an

untested one, for there was a time when only jurisdictional
challenges were permitted by way of habeas corpus.73
The post-Civil War civil rights statute,74 now codified as
42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a cause of action for deprivation of a
federal constitutional or statutory right under color of state
law.

Since 1793, the Anti-Injunction Act, in one form or

another, has prohibited federal court stays of state court
proceedings,75 but section 1983 has been held to fall within one
of the Act's exceptions.76

Accordingly, federal court intrusion

into the processes of a state court is considered permissible
when deemed necessary to redress civil rights violations
infecting those processes.77
The inevitable tensions caused by intervention under the
authority of section 1983 have impelled the Supreme Court to
formulate the doctrine commonly known as "Younger Abstention."78
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The doctrine, named for the case of Younger v. Harris,79
prohibits federal courts from enjoining pending state court
proceedings except on a "showing of bad faith, harassment, or any
other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable
relief."80

The doctrine is grounded in the principal of comity,

which Justice Black defined in Younger as "a proper respect for
state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and
a continuance of the belief that the National Government will
fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways."Bl
Referring to the dual system of government envisioned by the
Framers, Justice Black emphasized the need for sensitivity to the
interests of both systems.82

Most importantly, he warned that

"the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate
and protect federal rights and federal interests, always [must]
endeavor[] to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with
the legitimate activities of the States.n83

In defining

"comity," Justice Black was expressing his concern for the
survival of the concept of federalism.

In doing so, he

articulated a means by which dual court tension could be
alleviated when state court proceedings are threatened by federal
court application of section 1983.
Although Younger involved the denial of a federal court
injunction against an ongoing state criminal prosecution, the
doctrine it enunciated has been extended, most recently in
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Pennzoil v. Texaco,84 to apply to civil proceedings as well.

In

Pennzoil the Supreme Court dealt with a district court order
enjoining the plaintiff from enforcing a Texas state court
judgment in its favor in the amount of approximately eleven
billion dollars.

Texaco contended that the judgment was in

conflict with various federal constitutional provisions and that
the Texas bond and lien provision, which would have required a
bond of more than thirteen billion dollars to suspend execution
of the judgment, also suffered from federal constitutional
infirmities.

The Supreme Court said that "[b]oth the District

Court and the Court of Appeals failed to recognize the
significant interests harmed by their unprecedented intrusion
into the Texas judicial system"85 and "should have abstained
under the principles of federalism enunciated in Younger v.
Harris.n86

The Court noted that the Texas courts could have

resolved the issues in the case on state statutory or
constitutional grounds and should have been afforded the
opportunity to decide the federal constitutional claims as well.
The Court also noted that the claims could have been advanced
during a state court appeal that was pending at the time the
federal injunction was issued.

Moreover, the "open courts ..

provision of the Texas Constitution at all times afforded access
to the state courts for the resolution of issues that were not,
but could have been, raised in those courts.

In light of the

access available, the Supreme Court concluded that "the lower
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courts should have deferred on principles of comity to the
pending state proceedings .. "87
To me, the most interesting part of the Texaco decision is
not the extension of the Younger doctrine to all cases that
"involve challenges to the processes by which the State compels
compliance with the judgments of its courts.n88

Rather, it is

the suggestion of the merger of the abstention doctrines that
grabs my attention.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun

expressed his view that "the District Court should have abstained
under the principles announced in Railroad Comm•n of Texas v.
Pullman Co."89

Pullman abstention requires a federal court to

defer ruling on a constitutional question pending a determination
of state law issues by a state court, on the theory that such a
determination may resolve the entire case.90

There are other

abstention doctrines, some of which I have referred to earlier.91
The point is that the Pennzoil majority, rejecting Pullman
abstention for appellant's failure to argue it, said the
following in a footnote:
We merely note that considerations similar
to those that mandate Pullman abstention are
relevant to a courtis decision whether to
abstain under Younger. . . .
The various
types of abstention are not rigid
pigeonholes into which federal courts must
try to fit cases. Rather, they reflect a
complex of considerations designed to soften
the tensions inherent in a system that
contemplates parallel judicial processes.92
I believe that this footnote holds the potential for much
greater deference to the state courts under principles of

federalism and comity.93

I think that the realization of this

potential by the Supreme Court on a case-by-case basis will
contribute greatly to a softening of the tensions between court
systems arising from section 1983 litigation.

There are others,

of course, who would view the expansion of abstention in civil
rights cases as a very negative development.94
It is difficult to conceive of a conflict that causes more
strain in the dual court system than a lawsuit, brought against a
state judge in a federal court, relating to the judicial function
of the state judge and alleging a civil rights violation.
Although state judges, when engaged in the performance of
judicial acts, are absolutely immune from liability for damages
in civil rights actions,95 they "are not immune in § 1983 actions
when they are sued for declaratory or injunctive -- rather than
monetary -- relief."96

In such a case the Supreme Court has held

that counsel fees may be recovered against the judge under the
provisions of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976.97

That holding came in a case in which the United States

District Court enjoined a state magistrate from incarcerating
people charged with non-jailable offenses who could not make
bail.98

I

find myself in agreement with Justice Powell's dissent

in that case.

He not only considered counsel fees barred by the

doctrine of judicial immunity but went further to say the
following:
In sum, I see no principled reason why judicial
immunity should bar suits for damages but not for
prospective injunctive relief.
The fundamental
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rationale for providing this protection to the judicial
office -- articulated in the English cases and repeated
in decisions of this Court -- applies equally to both
types of asserted relief.
The underlying principle,
vital to the rule of law, is assurance of judicial
detachment and independence. Nor is the Court's
decision today in the broader public interest that the
doctrine of absolute immunity is intended to serve.99
If the Supreme Court won't do it, Congress should provide by
statute for the sort of judicial immunity envisioned by Justice
Powell and thereby remove a great source of inter-court system
tension.
In the area of criminal law, duplicative prosecutions often
cause conflict between state and federal courts.

The same

criminal conduct often forms the basis for prosecution under
state law as well as federal law.

Although some states,

including New York, have statutory provisions prohibiting state
prosecution after a prior federal prosecution,lOO the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the ConstitutionlOl has been held to be no bar
to separate prosecution by two sovereign governments.l02

The

upshot is a strange situation whereby courts are maneuvered by
prosecutors into positions of conflict.

For example, if a person

charged with criminal conduct can be convicted in a New York
court first, he or she can be prosecuted for the same criminal
conduct in a federal court at a later time.

There can then be

two separate, consecutive sentences for what is in effect the
same crime.

Because of the New York statute, however, the

converse is not true.

At the behest of the prosecutor, the state

court in such a situation would make every effort to schedule a
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state trial first, even at the expense of disrupting the federal
court's calendar and causing problems relating to compliance with
the federal Speedy Trial Act.l03

Moreover, witnesses and defense

lawyers cannot be present in two courts at the same time, a fact
that exacerbates the tension.
Aside from fairness concerns regarding double punishment and
prudential concerns relating to the expense of double
prosecution, the concept of dual sovereignty is not served by
conflicts of this nature.
varied.

Proposals to afford relief have been

One such proposal involves congressional preemption

under the Supremacy Clause.l04

While Congress has the power to

preempt state criminal statutes, it has done just the opposite by
saving state jurisdiction in several statutes defining federal
crimes.lOS

Despite such a savings clause, however,

Pennsylvania's Sedition Act was held to be displaced by the
federal Smith Act, which prohibited the overthrow of the United
States Government by force or violence.l06
The Department of Justice has attempted to afford some
relief through a policy "designed to limit the exercise of the
power to bring successive prosecutions for the same offense to
situations comporting with the rationale for the existence of
that power."l07

This policy, however, "is not constitutionally

mandated and confers no rights upon the accused."l08

An

expansion of the policy to include a total prohibition against
dual prosecution might be considered.

Other proposals include allowing the defendant a choice of
forums; prohibiting federal prosecution after state conviction;
and simply prohibiting dual prosecution altogether.l09

My

prescription in this area is state court jurisdiction over
federal crimesllO in all cases where the same criminal activity
is charged under both federal and state statutes.

This

prescription will relieve dual court tension, reduce the expense
of multiple prosecutions and allow a single judge to impose one
sentence for each instance of criminal misconduct.
Federal courts are authorized by statute to establish rules
regarding admission to practice and conduct of attorneys.lll
They are also said to have "inherent power" in such matters.ll2
Similar authority is considered to reside in the various state
judiciaries, since the practice of law is so intertwined with the
operation of the state courts.ll3

Reciprocity in disciplinary

matters seems to be the norm, although state and federal courts
have separate and distinct control over rules of admission and
conduct.ll4

The rub comes when federal courts are asked to

intrude in cases involving the discipline of attorneys by state
courts.

The Supreme Court was confronted with that exact problem

in 1982 in a case involving disciplinary charges made against a
New Jersey lawyer.ll5

The lawyer was accused of an ethical

violation, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,
as the result of certain comments he made to the press
criticizing a trial and a trial judge.

When the charges were

made by a county ethics committee, he did not respond but instead
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filed an action in the United States District Court complaining
that the disciplinary rules were overbroad and that they violated
his First Amendment rights.
questions in his case:

The Supreme Court posed these

"first, do state bar disciplinary

hearings within the constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction of
the State Supreme Court constitute an ongoing state judicial
proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate important state
interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the
state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges."ll6
Answering all three questions in the affirmative, the Supreme
Court held that the district court properly abstained from
intervening in a disciplinary proceeding that was, in effect, a
judicial matter being conducted under the aegis of the New·Jersey
Supreme Court.

The majority relied on the Younger doctrine, but

Justice Brennan opined in his pre-Pennzoil concurrence that
Younger generally is inapplicable to civil proceedings; he did
say, however, "that federal courts should show particular
restraint before intruding into an ongoing disciplinary
proceeding by a state court against a member of the State's bar,
where there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal issues in
that proceeding."ll7
The rule is a salutary one.

As a district court judge, I

abstained from considering an attorney's constitutional
challenge to an Appellate Division determination that his
disciplinary hearing should be closed.

The attorney pursued the

matter in the New York Court of Appeals and obtained a ruling

there that the hearing should be open, if the attorney waived
confidentiality, unless due cause for closure were
demonstrated.ll8

New York's highest court found it unnecessary

to address the constitutional question.

Thus was the clash of

courts avoided and balance in the dual court system maintained.
The expansion of federal court jurisdiction inevitably has
increased the conflict between state and federal courts.ll9

It

seems to me that all prescriptions for relieving these tensions
of our dual court system should be guided by the understanding
that one court system is not superior to another, either
hierarchicallyl20 or intellectually;l21 that there always will be
some overlapping of jurisdiction;l22 that the goal of equal
justice is superior to the goal of tension reduction; and that
the federal system of government erected by the Framers still
stands.
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